很多童鞋認(rèn)為托福閱讀是托福四單項(xiàng)中最容易拿分的部分而掉以輕心，其實(shí)是不對(duì)的。閱讀作為聽說(shuō)讀寫四部分中偏向文本輸入的部分，可以為我們的寫作和口語(yǔ)這兩項(xiàng)輸出積累充分的語(yǔ)料素材，比如亮眼獨(dú)特的詞組或句式，比如地道的西方寫作風(fēng)格。托福閱讀能力的提升除了需要做題，更需要在平時(shí)就增加英文文章的閱讀量。下面我們來(lái)看一篇經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人雙語(yǔ)閱讀素材：自由交流如何犯錯(cuò)。
Free exchange
How to be wrong
To err is human. Society is suffering from an inability to acknowledge as much
自由交流
如何犯錯(cuò)
人孰無(wú)過(guò)，但我們的社會(huì)卻因?yàn)椴荒苷J(rèn)識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)而受損
A NEWSPAPER cannot publish for 174 years without some mistakes. This one has made its share. We thought Britain was safe in the European exchange-rate mechanism just weeks before it crashed out; we opined, in 1997, that Indonesia was well placed to avoid financial crisis; we noted in 1999 that oil, at $10 per barrel, might well reach $5, almost perfectly timing the bottom of the market; and in 2003 we supported the invasion of Iraq. For individuals, like publications, errors are painful—particularly now, when the digital evidence of failure is both accessible and indelible. But they are also inevitable. The trick, then, is to err well: to recognise mistakes and learn from them. Worryingly, humanity may be getting worse at owning up to its goofs.
沒有哪份報(bào)紙能發(fā)行174年而從不出錯(cuò)，《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》也不例外。我們?cè)J(rèn)為英國(guó)在歐洲匯率機(jī)制中是安全的，結(jié)果沒過(guò)幾周它就遭遇慘敗，黯然退出該機(jī)制;1997年我們認(rèn)為印度尼西亞有足夠能力避免金融危機(jī);1999年石油每桶10美元時(shí)，我們寫到油價(jià)很可能會(huì)跌到每桶5美元，但在幾乎同一時(shí)間，油價(jià)觸底;2003年我們還曾支持入侵伊拉克。和出版物一樣，個(gè)人犯錯(cuò)也很痛苦，特別是現(xiàn)在，錯(cuò)誤都會(huì)留下數(shù)字證據(jù)，既無(wú)從掩藏又無(wú)法抹除。但錯(cuò)誤也是不可避免的，所以關(guān)鍵在于要“會(huì)”犯錯(cuò)：認(rèn)識(shí)到錯(cuò)誤并從中吸取經(jīng)驗(yàn)。令人擔(dān)憂的是，人類可能會(huì)越來(lái)越不會(huì)承認(rèn)錯(cuò)誤。
Few enjoy the feeling of being caught out in an error. But real trouble starts when the desire to avoid a reckoning leads to a refusal to grapple with contrary evidence. economists often assume that people are rational. Faced with a new fact, rational actors should update their view of the world in order to take better decisions in future. Yet years of economic research illuminate the ways in which human cognition veers from rationality. Studies confirm what is obvious from experience: people frequently disregard information that conflicts with their view of the world.
很少有人喜歡犯錯(cuò)被抓現(xiàn)行的感覺。但是，如果一心想要避免懲罰，以致于拒絕去面對(duì)相反的事實(shí)，真正的麻煩就來(lái)了。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家通常都假定人是理性的，面對(duì)新的事實(shí)，理性的人應(yīng)該更新自己的世界觀，好在今后做出更好的決定。然而，多年的經(jīng)濟(jì)研究表明，人類認(rèn)知存在偏離理性的情況。研究證實(shí)了經(jīng)驗(yàn)中顯而易見的情況：人們經(jīng)常會(huì)無(wú)視與自己的世界觀相左的信息。
Why should that be? Last year Roland Bénabou, of Princeton, and Jean Tirole, of the Toulouse School of Economics, presented a framework for thinking about the problem. In many ways, beliefs are like other economic goods. People spend time and resources building them, and derive value from them. Some beliefs are like consumption goods: a passion for conservation can make its owner feel good, and is a public part of his identity, like fashion. Other beliefs provide value by shaping behaviour. The conviction that one is a good salesman may help generate the confidence needed to close sales; religious asceticism can help one avoid unhealthy habits.
為什么會(huì)這樣呢?去年，普林斯頓大學(xué)的羅蘭·貝納布(Roland Bénabou)和圖盧茲經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院(Toulouse School of Economics)的讓·蒂羅(Jean Tirole)提出了一個(gè)思考此問(wèn)題的框架。在許多方面，信念就像其他經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)品一樣。人們花費(fèi)時(shí)間和資源制造信念，并從中獲得價(jià)值。有些信念就如同消費(fèi)品：對(duì)環(huán)境保護(hù)的熱情可以讓一個(gè)人感覺良好，這種熱情和時(shí)尚一樣，是他個(gè)人身份塑造中對(duì)外展示的一面。其他信念通過(guò)塑造行為來(lái)提供價(jià)值，比如深信自己是一名優(yōu)秀的推銷員可能有助于建立信心，做成生意;又比如宗教禁欲主義可以幫助人避免不健康的習(xí)慣。
Because beliefs, however, are not simply tools for making good decisions, but are treasured in their own right, new information that challenges them is unwelcome. People often engage in “motivated reasoning” to manage such challenges. Mr Bénabou classifies this into three categories. “Strategic ignorance” is when a believer avoids information offering conflicting evidence. In “reality denial” troubling evidence is rationalised away: house-price bulls might conjure up fanciful theories for why prices should behave unusually, and supporters of a disgraced politician might invent conspiracies or blame fake news. And lastly, in “self-signalling”, the believer creates his own tools to interpret the facts in the way he wants: an unhealthy person, for example, might decide that going for a daily run proves he is well.
不過(guò)，信念不僅僅是幫助人們做出明智決定的工具，其本身就受人珍視。因此，挑戰(zhàn)這些信念的新信息就不受待見。人們經(jīng)常通過(guò)“動(dòng)機(jī)性推理”來(lái)應(yīng)付這些挑戰(zhàn)。貝納布將動(dòng)機(jī)性推理分為三類。“策略性忽視”是指持有某種信念的人回避與其信念相抵觸的證據(jù)?！胺穸ìF(xiàn)實(shí)”的人會(huì)把令其不安的證據(jù)合理化：看漲房?jī)r(jià)的人可能會(huì)提出稀奇古怪的理論，解釋價(jià)格為什么就應(yīng)該表現(xiàn)異常;而一個(gè)遭人唾棄的政客的支持者可能會(huì)發(fā)明陰謀論或指責(zé)假新聞。最后，“自我提示”型的人為自己創(chuàng)造工具，以自己想要的方式來(lái)解釋事實(shí)。例如，一個(gè)病人可能會(huì)認(rèn)為每天跑步就能證明自己身體健康。
Motivated reasoning is a cognitive bias to which better-educated people are especially prone. Not all the errors it leads to are costly: preaching the superiority of Arsenal despite contradictory evidence does little harm. But when biases are broadly shared—within troubled firms, say, or financial markets or political parties—danger lurks. Motivated reasoning helps explain why viewpoints polarise even as more information is more easily available than ever before. That it is easy to find convincing demolitions of climate-change myths, for example, has not curbed misinformation on the topic. But the demand for good (or bad) information is uneven. Polling shows, for example, that Democrats with high levels of scientific knowledge are more concerned about climate change than fellow partisans with less scientific background; among Republicans, the level of scientific awareness has no effect on climate beliefs. Even, or especially, sophisticated news consumers look for what they want to find.
動(dòng)機(jī)性推理這種認(rèn)知偏見特別容易出現(xiàn)在受過(guò)良好教育的人身上。不是所有因這種偏見而犯的錯(cuò)誤都會(huì)付出巨大代價(jià)：無(wú)視相反證據(jù)而鼓吹阿森納隊(duì)有多出色并沒什么危害。然而，偏見如果被廣為接受，比如在出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題的公司里，或者在金融市場(chǎng)或政黨內(nèi)，就會(huì)危機(jī)四伏。動(dòng)機(jī)性推理可以解釋為什么雖然人們現(xiàn)在更容易獲得更多的信息，觀點(diǎn)卻仍會(huì)兩極分化。例如，如今很容易就能找到令人信服的證據(jù)來(lái)推翻有關(guān)氣候變化的錯(cuò)誤觀念，但關(guān)于這一問(wèn)題的不實(shí)信息卻并未得到遏制。不過(guò)，對(duì)優(yōu)質(zhì)(或不良)信息的需求是不均衡的。例如，調(diào)查顯示，科學(xué)知識(shí)水平較高的民主黨人比科學(xué)背景較差的民主黨人更關(guān)心氣候變化;而在共和黨人中，科學(xué)認(rèn)知水平對(duì)個(gè)人的氣候觀點(diǎn)并沒有影響。就連成熟的新聞消費(fèi)者也會(huì)去找那些自己想看的東西看，或者說(shuō)他們尤其會(huì)如此。
Work by Mr Bénabou suggests that groupthink is highest when people within groups face a shared fate: when choosing to break from a group is unlikely to spare an individual the costs of the group’s errors. If an individual politician’s fortunes rise and fall with his party’s, breaking from groupthink brings little individual benefit (and may impose individual costs). The incentive to engage in motivated reasoning is high as a result. Even as the facts on a particular issue converge in one direction, parties can still become increasingly polarised around starkly different belief-sets. That, in turn, can make it harder still for a member of one party to derive any benefit from breaking ranks. Indeed, the group has an incentive to delegitimise independent voices, such as statistical agencies or budget watchdogs. So the unanimity of views can be hard to escape until it contributes to a crisis.
貝納布的研究表明，如果群體中的人面臨共同命運(yùn)，一個(gè)人并不可能靠脫離群體來(lái)免于承擔(dān)群體錯(cuò)誤的代價(jià)，那么這種情況下趨同思維的水平是最高的。如果某個(gè)政客的命運(yùn)與所屬黨派的命運(yùn)休戚相關(guān)，那么跳脫趨同思維就不會(huì)帶來(lái)個(gè)人利益(而且個(gè)人還可能會(huì)付出代價(jià))。如此一來(lái)，人們采取動(dòng)機(jī)型推理的動(dòng)力就會(huì)增強(qiáng)。即便某個(gè)問(wèn)題的事實(shí)都已指向同一個(gè)方向，各方仍然會(huì)堅(jiān)持迥然不同的看法而愈發(fā)兩極分化。這樣一來(lái)，一方某個(gè)成員就更難通過(guò)脫離群體來(lái)獲得任何利益。事實(shí)上，團(tuán)體有動(dòng)機(jī)去消弭獨(dú)立的聲音，比如來(lái)自統(tǒng)計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)或預(yù)算監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)的意見，所以它很難擺脫整齊劃一的意見，直至這導(dǎo)致危機(jī)爆發(fā)。
Lowering the cost of admitting error could help defuse these crises. A new issue of Econ Journal Watch, an online journal, includes a symposium in which prominent economic thinkers are asked to provide their “most regretted statements”. Held regularly, such exercises might take the shame out of changing your mind. Yet the symposium also shows how hard it is for scholars to grapple with intellectual regret. Some contributions are candid; Tyler Cowen’s analysis of how and why he underestimated the risk of financial crisis in 2007 is enlightening. But some disappoint, picking out regrets that cast the writer in a flattering light or using the opportunity to shift blame.
降低承認(rèn)錯(cuò)誤的代價(jià)有助于緩解這些危機(jī)。在線雜志《經(jīng)濟(jì)期刊觀察》(Econ Journal Watch)最新一期有一個(gè)專題研討，請(qǐng)杰出的經(jīng)濟(jì)思想家說(shuō)出他們 “最后悔的言論”。這樣的活動(dòng)如果定期舉行，人們也許就不再那么恥于改變想法。然而，這個(gè)專題研討也顯示出，要專家們面對(duì)自己的錯(cuò)誤判斷并非易事。有些專家很坦誠(chéng)：泰勒·考恩(Tyler Cowen)分析了自己如何以及為何低估了2007年金融危機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，富有啟發(fā)性。但也有些專家令人失望。他們要么專門挑出一些實(shí)為增加自己光環(huán)的所謂錯(cuò)誤，要么就利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)轉(zhuǎn)移責(zé)任。
I don’t want to be right
Public statements of regret are risky in a rigidly polarised world. Admissions of error both provide propaganda for ideological opponents and annoy fellow-travellers. Some economists used to seethe when members of the guild acknowledged that trade liberalisation could yield costs as well as benefits—though economic models had always allowed for this. In the long run, such self-censorship probably eroded trust in economists’ arguments more than it built support for trade. It is rarely in the interest of those in the right to pretend that they are never wrong.
無(wú)需永遠(yuǎn)正確
在分化嚴(yán)重的世界中，公開表示后悔是有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的。承認(rèn)錯(cuò)誤既落了敵對(duì)者的口實(shí)，又會(huì)惹惱同一陣營(yíng)的人。一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家曾在其他同行承認(rèn)貿(mào)易自由化既有利益又有代價(jià)時(shí)怒火中燒，盡管經(jīng)濟(jì)模型一直都考慮到了這種情況。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，相比為自由貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)取到更多的支持，這種自我審查可能會(huì)更多地削弱人們對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家觀點(diǎn)的信任。有理的一方假裝自己永不會(huì)犯錯(cuò)，這于他們自身無(wú)益。
